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RECENT CASES 
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 
Leases 
Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396 
F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975). 
Plaintiff and defendant were the holders of offshore oil conces-
sion agreements granted by two different Persian Gulf sheikdoms, 
Sharjah and Umm Al Qaywayn. Disputes arose between the sheik-
doms as to their respective sovereignty over the territorial and off-
shore waters. Sharjah and Iran collaborated in a successful assertion 
of physical jurisdiction, thus depriving plaintiff of the exercise of its 
concession. Plaintiff brought suit in a U.S. district court to recover 
extracted oil arriving in the United States. The court recognized the 
defendant's oil concession after the defendant invoked the act of 
state doctrine. 
The case turned on the applicability of the Hickenlooper 
Amendment's• limitation on the act of state doctrine. If the Amend-
ment did not apply, the act of state doctrine would prevent the court 
from reaching the merits. 
The Hickenlooper Amendment was a Congressional response to 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 2 and changed the Court's 
presumption in cases involving act of state arguments. Under the 
Hickenlooper Amendment, the courts could hear these cases unless 
specifically requested not to by the Executive Branch. Formerly, the 
courts would decline to decide such cases without a request by the 
Executive Branch because of the act of state doctrine. In 
1. The relevant portion of 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1970) reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall 
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on 
the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a 
claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign 
state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a 
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of state in violation of 
the principles of international law . ... Provided, That this subparagraph, shall not 
be applicable . . . (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines 
that application of the act of state is required in that particular case by the foreign 
policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his 
behalf in that case with the Court. 
22 U.S.C . § 2370 (e)(2) (1970). 
2. 376 U.S. 398 (1963) . 
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Occidental, however, the court noted that the Amendment has been 
very strictly applied to cases where a claim of title or other right to 
specific property has been expropriated abroad.3 As in Sabbatino, 
the claim was based on confiscation in violation of international 
law. 
The court refused to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment in 
this case, as there was no "confiscation" as defined in the 
Amendment. The court rejected the contention that a confiscation 
of plaintiff's concession agreement occurred when the territorial 
water boundary dispute arose and that the plaintiff's concession was 
no longer recognized. The court stated that a claim to submerged 
lands under a leasing agreement was not what was envisioned by 
Congress when it drafted the Amendment. 
The Occidental court also went on to note that the Amend-
ment's application has been limited to cases involving claims of title 
to American-owned property nationalized by foreign governments, 
and that is has not been held applicable to contract claims.4 This 
distinction was drawn in French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, which 
held that the repudiation of a contractual obligation was not a con-
fiscation or other taking within the meaning of the Hickenlooper 
Amendment.5 Therefore, the court felt that the dispute was not over 
an alleged confiscation of oil or oil wells. The property which was 
allegedly confiscated was the plaintiff's concession agreement. This 
was nothing more than a lease contract-a contractual right to ex-
plore and extract oil in a given area. It did not involve a claim of 
title or other right to property and thus did not fall within the ambit 
of the Amendment. 
The court concluded, as well, that this was definitely a case in 
which the act of state doctrine should be applied, as it could not 
have been Congress' intention to have American courts make deci-
sions concerning a foreign government's sovereignty over their terri-
torial and offshore waters, or submerged lands. 
Sales 
United Bank Limited v. Cosmic International, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 
262 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
This was an interpleader action, with Cosmic International, 
3. See French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 
433 (1968). 
4. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub. nom., 
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974). 
5. 23 N.Y.2d at 64. 
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Inc. as the stakeholder. Cosmic held the proceeds of sales to it of 
jute products made in East Pakistan and shipped to the United 
States during 1971. Before Cosmic could make payment, East Paki-
stan declared its independence from Pakistan and became Bangla-
desh on April 10, 1971. On February 28, 1972, the new government 
of Bangladesh issued a decree expropriating all property owned by 
citizens of a state at war with Bangladesh, namely Pakistan. No 
provision was made for compensation. On March 26, 1972, the 
Bangladesh government nationalized all industries and banks 
whose title had not already vested in the government under any 
prior law. 
The Pakistani plaintiffs contended that the funds in the hands 
of Cosmic should be paid to them because the goods were delivered 
and the right of payment arose in the United States before Bangla-
desh declared its independence and nationalized all Pakistani prop-
erty in the country. The Bangladesh plaintiffs claimed the proceeds 
as the successors to the Pakistani's property under the nationaliza-
tion order and in accordance with the act of state doctrine.8 
Under the act of state doctrine, courts of the United States may 
not inquire into actions of the Bangladesh government if the prop-
erty in question was in Bangladesh and under its control at the time 
of the taking, even if such taking violates principles of international 
law.7 However, in this case the property was not in Bangladesh 
either at the time of the declaration of independence or during the 
ensuing expropriation decrees. The sales had already been consum-
mated-all that remained was the right to payment which was to 
be made in New York City. The court held that the act of state 
doctrine did not apply in this case. It found that New York was 
the situs of the obligation at the time of the attempted taking by 
the Bangladesh government.8 Therefore, U.S. courts need only give 
6. The classic statement of this doctrine is found in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S . 
250, 252: 
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of 
another done within its own territory. 
7. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963). The doctrine is based on 
the notion that the courts should not intervene in the political affairs of foreign govern-
ments. 
8. See also Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965); 
Menendez v. Saks & Co. , 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973) cert. granted sub nom., Alfred Dunhill 
or'London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974). These cases hold that, if property 
is not in the expropriating state at the time of the taking, the act of state doctrine does not 
apply . 
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effect to those acts of state consistent with the law and policy of the 
United States.11 
The court went on to note that the situs of the debts were with 
the debtor. 10 It rejected the claim of the Bangladesh plaintiffs that, 
because Cosmic would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Bangla-
desh courts if a suit had been brought there, the situs of the debt 
was Bangladesh and the act of state doctrine would apply. However, 
the court felt that it should not upset long established American 
precedent as to the situs of a debt. 11 
The court also rejected the Bangladesh plaintiffs' claim to the 
proceeds of the sale based on the financial needs of their country due 
to previous economic exploitation. Although the court was aware of 
the difficulties of newly emerging nations, it felt required to follow 
neutral principles of law. The Pakistani plaintiffs were awarded the 
proceeds of the sale. 
ADMIRALTY 
Jones Act 
Hicks v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
Plaintiffs, three crew members working on a submersible oil 
storage facility, 12 brought suit against defendants, Ocean Drilling 
Development and Exploration Co. (ODECO), the owner of the sub-
mersible oil facility, and H.B. Buster Hughes, Inc., 13 an oil field 
9. See 353 F.2d at 51; 485 F.2d at 1361. 
10. See also 485 F.2d at 1365. 
11. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1904). 
12. The submersible oil facility is known in the trade as a "Round Barge." In addition 
to being equipped to store oil, the facility was equipped with a galley and quarters for the 
crew. The facility operated primarily on the seabed, but surfaced to relocate and for repairs. 
The court described the facility in this manner: 
This facility is made up of a superstructure two hundred feet in length and fifty-four 
feet in width constructed approximately forty feet above cylindrical storage tanks 
fourteen and one-half feet in diameter. Two of the tanks run the entire length of the 
superstructure. These are connected to four storage tanks evenly spaced and running 
the width of the superstructure. This rectangular assemblage of tanks forms the lower 
structure of the Round Barge. There is a continuous fin or skirt five feet in height 
around the entire underside of the cylindrical storage tanks, specifically designed to 
sink the structure in a vertical position in the mud floor of the Gulf of Mexico and 
to hold the facility in a stationary position. The fin was attached to the outer tanks. 
512 F.2d at 819. 
13. Only two of the three plaintiffs filed claims against H.B. Buster Hughes, Inc., and 
these claims were dismissed by the plaintiffs at the conclusion of the testimony before the 
jury. 512 F.2d at 821. 
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contractor, to recov~r damages for personal injuries under the Jones 
Act. 14 The plaintiffs alleged that the facility was not seaworthy, and 
that this unseaworthiness caused the facility to shake, tilt, and to 
refloat on its side when ballast was removed to surface the facility, 
causing the injuries to the plaintiffs. The jury, which had been 
provided with specific interrogatories, found for the plaintiffs, and 
the district court entered judgment accordingly .15 The court of ap-
peals affirmed. 
ODECO contended on appeal that the jury's finding of fact that 
the oil storage facility was a vessel within the scope of the Jones Act 
was not supported by the evidence presented at trial. Citing Atkins 
v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 16 ODECO analogized the oil stor-
age facility to a dry dock, which Atkins held not to be a vessel within 
the Jones Act. 
Rejecting ODECO's contention, Judge Jones, writing for the 
court of appeals, first stated that ODECO's reliance upon Atkins 
was misplaced. The dispositive factor in Atkins was "the absence 
of the element of risk and the hazards of the sea." 17 The attachment 
of the oil storage facility to the seabed was not analogous to the 
attachment of the drydock to the shore; the protective factor was 
not fixation per se, but fixation to the shore. Finally, the oil storage 
facility was not permanently stationary, but was towed to various 
locations, further distinguishing it from a drydock. 
14. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688 (1971), provides in pertinent part: 
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment 
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial 
by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending 
the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees 
shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal 
injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for dam-
ages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United 
States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway 
employees shall be applicable . . . . 
15. The case raised five principal issues: (1) whether the oil storage facility was a vessel 
within the Jones Act; (2) whether the plaintiffs were borrowed employees; (3) whether the 
accident was within the indemnity provision of the contract between ODECO and Hughes 
because defendant ODECO cross claimed against Hughes for indemnity; (4) whether the 
indemnity provision was contrary to Louisiana public policy; and (5) what was the contrac-
tual limit on liability. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court giving 
judgment for the plaintiffs against ODECO, and giving judgment in favor of ODECO in its 
cross claim against Hughes. This case note will consider only the issue of whether the oil 
storage facility was a vessel within the Jones Act. 
16. 411 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969). 
17. 512 F.2d at 823. 
5
et al.: Back matter
Published by SURFACE, 1975
442 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:437 
In Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 18 this same court 
had rejected the ''permanence of fixation'' test as not determinative 
in distinguishing structures which are vessels under the Jones Act, 
and had adopted the position that "the purpose for which a facility 
was constructed and the business in which it was engaged are the 
controlling considerations." 19 Cook held that a submersible drilling 
barge was a vessel within the context of the Jones Act, and in Hicks 
Judge Jones held that an oil storage facility is very similar to an oil 
drilling barge: "Such structures are vessels for Jones Act jurisdic-
tional purposes." 20 The court also cited with approval Offshore 
Company v. Robinson, 21 another case holding that the Jones Act 
covers: 
"[a]lmost any structure that once floated or is capable of floating 
on navigable waters" and the word "vessel" includes "special pur-
pose structures not usually employed as a means of transport by 
water but designed to float in water . . . . " 22 
The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury's finding that the unseaworthiness of the oil storage 
vessel was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plain-
tiffs. 
AIRLINE LIABILITY 
Embarkation 
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975). 
This action grew out of terrorist shootings by two members of 
the "Black September" 23 organization at Athens' Hellenikon Air-
18. 472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973). 
19. 512 F.2d at 823. 
20. Id. at 824. 
21. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959). 
22. 512 F.2d at 824, quoting from 266 F.2d at 771, 779. 
23. At approximately 3:00 PM on August 5, 1973, two or more Jordanian terrorists 
commenced a violent attack on passengers in the transit lounge of Hellenikon Airport. The 
terrorists threw three grenades exploding in rapid succession, followed with several gunshots 
fired into the crowd. Taking 32 people as hostages, the terrorists demanded an aircraft to take 
them to a "friendly country." Finally at about 5:20 PM after tense and lengthy negotiations, 
the terrorists surrendered. 
As a result of the terrorist attack, 40 TWA passengers were wounded, three TWA passen-
gers died, four TWA employees were injured, and an indeterminable number of passengers 
and employees of other airlines were wounded. 
Statements made by terrorists to the police subsequent to their arrest indicate that they 
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port in August of 1973. Passengers, who were in the airport's transit 
lounge awaiting departure of a TWA flight to New York, sued the 
airlines under the Warsaw Convention for personal injuries sus-
tained in the shootings. At the time of the attack, plaintiffs had 
already presented their tickets at the TWA checking desk, had been 
issued boarding passes, and had been assigned seat numbers and 
baggage checks. Plaintiffs had proceeded through passport and cur-
rency control, and were waiting to go through or had just gone 
through physical and hand baggage checks.24 
Plaintiffs specifically relied on Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention, which provides for the strict liability of carriers for bodily 
injury to passengers sustained on board the aircraft or while "in the 
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. "25 
The court's decision to grant plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of TWA's liability turned on its determina-
tion that these plaintiffs had completed a sufficient number of the 
procedures required to be considered in the process of embarking. 
After delineating 11 steps through which passengers were required 
to proceed in order to board the aircraft, 28 the court concluded that 
the passengers had been in the course of embarking within the 
meaning of Article 17, as they all had completed at least five of those 
steps. 27 
had intended to attack Israel immigrant passengers on TWA flights going to Tel Aviv, but 
in error struck when passengers, including plaintiffs, were boarding the New York bound 
flight. 
24. 393 F. Supp. at 219. 
25. Article 17 provides: 
The carrier is liable for damages sustained in the event of the death or wounding of 
a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which 
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of 
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by 
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (effective Oct. 29, 
1934). 
26. 393 F. Supp. at 221. The court delineated the following procedures to which passen-
gers were required to submit before boarding the aircraft: 
1. Presenting tickets to the TWA checking desk. 
2. Obtaining boarding passes. 
3. Obtaining baggage checks. 
4. Obtaining an assigned seat number. 
5. Passing through passport and currency control. 
6. Submitting to search of person for weapons and explosives. 
7. Submitting to search of carry-on luggage for weapons and explosives. 
8. Walking through gate for bus to aircraft. 
9. Boarding bus. 
10. Riding on bus 100 yards to aircraft. 
11. Getting off bus and onto aircraft. 
27. Contra, Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975). 
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The Court reasoned that, although the Warsaw Convention had 
not defined "embarking," it designated "in the course of any of the 
operations of embarking" as a purposeful activity28 and that Article 
17 should be liberally construed to achieve the intent of the Conven-
tion. 29 Thus, the court concluded that, under modern conditions of 
international air travel, the period between the moment a passenger 
enters the airport until he is safely on board the aircraft often com-
prises a substantial amount of time and effort, much of which may 
reasonably be said to constitute embarking.30 
The district court was careful to indicate that it was not at-
tempting to draw inflexible rules regarding air carrier liability to 
passengers not yet on board the aircraft, but was restricting itself 
to the totality of the circumstances affecting these particular plain-
tiffs.31 
Mental Anguish 
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975). 
Consistent with the expansion of carrier liability to passengers 
under the 1966 Montreal Amendment to the Warsaw Convention, 32 
In another suit arising from the very same incidents involved in Day, the court held contra 
to Day. The court in Evangelinos reasoned that all eleven steps of embarkation (see 393 F. 
Supp. at 221) are "absolutely essential," and that "without one, a passenger could not 
'embark' upon the aircraft." 396 F. Supp. at 102. 
28. 393 F. Supp. at 222. See Sullivan, Codification of Air Carrier Liability by Interna-
tional Convention, 7 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 18-22 (1936). 
29. 393 F. Supp. at 222. The court relied on two premises: (1) that a court should look 
to the diplomatic and legislative history of the convention to determine the correct interpreta-
tion of Article 17, Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 318 U.S. 423 (1943); Jactor v. Laubenheimer, 390 
U.S. 276 (1933); MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971); and (2) that 
the convention is to be liberally construed so as to carry out the intention and purpose of the 
parties. See Detenorio v. McGavan, 364 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Miss. 1973). 
30. 393 F. Supp. at 222. Although the drafters of the Convention established a test based 
on a purposeful activity, "embarking," occasionally it may be unclear when liability was to 
attach as the term is not a clear cut one. The court suggested that what constitutes embarking 
is still a question of degree, and that reasonable men may differ widely as to where the line 
should be placed and when liability should attach. 
31. 393 F. Supp. at 223. The court distinguished this case from Felismina v. TWA, 13 
Av. Cus. 17, 145 (S.D.N .Y. 1974), which concerned disembarking. There the court noted that, 
unlike the present plaintiffs, passengers leaving an aircraft have few activities if any which 
the air carrier requires them to perform in specific sequence as a condition to completing the 
journey. Id. 
32. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T .S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (effective Oct. 29, 
1934). The United States became dissatisfied with the level of liability provided for by the 
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the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has 
held that claims solely for mental pain and anguish are actionable 
under Article 1733 of the Warsaw System. 
Plaintiff's claim in Husserl grew out of the hijacking of a Swiss 
Air plane by Arab terrorists in September of 1970. Shortly after 
takeoff from Amman, Jordan, the terrorist group directed the pilot 
to fly to a deserted area near Amman, where passengers were forced 
to remain on board for some 24 hours. Passengers were then moved 
to a hotel in Amman where they remained until September 11. It 
was not until September 13 that they finally arrived in New York, 
their original destination. 
Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, liability of Swiss Air for mental 
pain and anguish resulting from expectation of severe injury and/or 
death, and that the trauma of the hijacking experience, including 
the return trip and questioning in Zurich, caused various mental 
and psychosomatic injuries. 34 Swiss Air moved for summary judg-
ment and dismissal on the grounds: (1) that the Warsaw System 
provides the exclusive relief available for injuries sustained in inter-
national transportation; and (2) that the phrase "death or wound-
ing ... or any other bodily injury"35 did not comprehend mental 
anguish, pain, or suffering. Consequently, Swiss Air argued that 
plaintiff's claim did not fall within the Warsaw System. The district 
court, however, held that Swiss Air was not entitled to summary 
judgment on the grounds asserted, as a matter of law, 36 since there 
Convention, and in 1966 arrangements were made wherein certain airlines filed tariffs with 
CAB, raising their limit of liability to $75,000, and waiving the defense allowed them under 
Article 20(1) of the Convention. Article 20(1) provides: 
The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary 
measures to avoid the damages, or that it was impossible for him or them to take 
such measures. 
Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Proto-
col (The Montreal Agreement), 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). 
The Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, is referred to as the 
Warsaw System. For a discussion of events leading up to the Montreal Agreement see Lowen-
feld & Mendelson, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 493 
(1967) . 
33. Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (effective 
Oct. 29, 1934) . See note 25 supra. 
34. 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S .D.N.Y. 1975). See Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw, and 
the Problem of Psychic Trauma, 1 SYR. J. lNT'L L. & CoM. 345 (1973). 
35. 388 F. Supp. at 1242. 
36. The defendant, Swiss Air, had previously moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that "hijacking" was not an "accident" and therfore not within the contemplation 
of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement. The same district court denied the 
9
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were material issues of fact yet to be resolved. 37 
The court's decision identified two legal premises. First, citing 
substantial precedent, the court reiterated that the Warsaw System 
did not create a claim for relief but merely created a presumption 
of liability, and that the System set the maximum limitation on 
carrier's liability if, and only if, the substantive law of the jurisdic-
tion provided a cause of action.38 The court concluded that the War-
saw System is exclusive only in that it specifies the exclusive relief 
available for certain types of injuries sustained in international 
transportation if such injuries were described in Articles 17, 18, and 
19 of the Convention.39 
Second, despite case law to the contrary, 40 the court reasoned 
that "death or wounding ... or any other bodily injury" in Article 
17 did in fact comprehend mental and psychosomatic injuries. Con-
ceding that the intent of the Convention was to regulate in a uni-
motion, holding that hijacking is within the meaning of the term "accident," and that like 
sabotage (which was specifically discussed at Montreal) it was the intent of all parties to hold 
carriers "liable to the innocent victims of such intentional acts." 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973). After denying Swiss Air's motion, the 
court went on to suggest that mental anguish and suffering were not contemplated in the 
phrase "wounding or other bodily injury." It reasoned that, whereas the Guatemala Protocol 
had substituted that phrase for "personal injury," and the Montreal Agreement did not see 
fit to make a similar change, the intention must have been that the phrase bodily injury be 
literally interpreted. 351 F. Supp. at 708. 
37. In determining whether Swiss Air's motion should be granted, the court viewed the 
plaintiff's case in a light most favorable to her, putting aside any doubt that she would not 
be able to prove injury and causation. Chapter III of the Convention provides for a presump-
tion of the carrier's liability if carrier is engaged in international transportation. However, in 
order to obtain relief under the Warsaw System, the plaintiff must prove that the accident 
was the proximate cause of her injuries, as well as actual damages. See MacDonald v. Air 
Canada, Inc., 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971). 
38. See Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 907 (1957); Komolos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953). The court further 
comments that, had Articles 17, 18, 19, and 24 been intended to create independent causes 
of action, they would have referred to causes "arising under" those articles rather than 
"covered by" them. 388 F. Supp. at 1251. 
39. Articles 17, 18, and 19 raise presumption of the carrier's liability for delay and 
personal injuries. However, Article 17 is the only one which deals with the presumption of 
liability for personal injuries and is therefore the only article applicable to this case. 388 F. 
Supp. at 1245. 
40. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (D.N.M. 1973) held 
that mental anguish alone was not covered, but that emotional distress directly precipitated 
by bodily injury could be considered as part of that bodily injury. Rosman v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 110 (1974), held airlines 
liable for palpable objective bodily injuries, including those caused by psychic trauma of the 
hijacking, but not for trauma as such or for non-bodily or behaviorial manifestations of that 
trauma. 
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form manner the conditions of international transportation with 
respect to carrier liability, the court nevertheless rejected Swiss 
Air's inclusio unius est exclusio alterius argument. 41 It pointed to the 
fact that Articles 16, 17, and 18 provide relief for any action based 
on injuries "however founded, " 42 and noted that the Convention's 
drafter chose these specific words in order to accommodate the mul-
tifarious bases upon which a claim might be founded in different 
countries, as well as to include all bases upon which a claim for relief 
might be had in one country. 43 Furthermore, the court reasoned that 
had the drafters intended to limit preexisting rights, their expres-
sion would have been clear, since ambiguity or silence is rarely, if 
ever, sufficient. 44 
In further support of its conclusion, the court noted that, since 
the drafting of the Warsaw Convention, vast strides have been made 
in the field of physiology and psychology, and that it is commonly 
recognized today that mental reactions and functions are merely 
subtle and less well understood physiological phenomena associated 
with physical trauma. Therefore, the court concluded that the 
phrase "bodily injury" could easily be construed to comprehend all 
personal injuries which directly and adversely affect the organic 
functions of a human being. 45 
The district court's opinion in Husserl apparently indicates 
that an airline passenger unable to show physical bodily injury (that 
is, a wound) may seek relief under the Warsaw System, thereby 
taking advantage of the presumption of liability and waiver of de-
fenses of the carrier, assuming, however, that the plaintiff can show 
proximate cause as well as actual injury. 
41. 388 F. Supp. at 1246. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1245. 
44. 388 F. Supp. at 1246. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 
640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964). The court suggested that the most plausible inference to be 
drawn from the Convention's silence as to some types of injuries is that the drafters had 
neglected to deal with a problem which they would have wished to resolve, if they had been 
aware of its existence. 388 F. Supp. at 1246. 
45. 388 F. Supp. at 1250. See also Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of 
Psychic Trauma, 1 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 345 (1973). Without elaboration, the court indi-
cated that it would construe "on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operation of 
embarking or disembarking" in Article 17 to include the time spent by plaintiff in Amman 
where passengers were forced to leave the airplane. 388 F.2d at 1247. 
11
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ALIENS 
Homosexuals 
In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Ore. 1975). 
Petitioner, a citizen of New Zealand and a veteran of the 
United States Army, sought naturalization as an American citizen. 
Because of his military service, 46 the conditions of naturalization 
such as permanent residency in the United States were waived.47 
However, there remained the burden of establishing "good moral 
character. " 48 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service argued that peti-
tioner's homosexual conduct made him unfit morally. The district 
court conceded that such sexual deviation could have been used to 
deny him admission to the country, 49 but that grounds for exclusion 
are not necessarily identical to grounds for denying citizenship be-
cause of moral unfitness. 
Recognizing an increasing tolerance of homosexuality among 
consenting adults, the court held that the petitioner was entitled to 
be naturalized. 
Misrepresentation 
Reid v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 420 U.S. 619 
(1975). 
Petitioners, husband and wife, had entered the country by 
falsely asserting that they were U.S. citizens. Thereafter they had 
two children. In this action they sought to use the citizenship of 
their children as a defense to a deportation proceeding commenced 
against them. 
Aliens are subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) if 
either: (1) they were "excludable" at the time of entry; or (2) they 
entered the United States without inspection, in violation of law.50 
46. Petitioner was honorably discharged by reason of homosexual acts. 394 F. Supp. at 
1210. 
47. 8 u.s.c. § 1440 (1970). 
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "No person except as otherwise 
provided in this subchapter shall be naturalized unless such petitioner ... (3) ... is a 
person of good moral character . . . . " 
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1970), which states in part: "[T]he following classes of 
aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United 
States ... (4) Aliens inflicted with psychopathetic personality, [or] sexual deviation 
" 
50. 8 U.S.C. § 125l(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part: 
Any alien in the United States ... shall, upon the order of the Attorney Gen-
12
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Because of their misrepresentation as to their U.S. citizenship, peti-
tioners were excludable at the time of entry under 8 U .S.C. 
§1182(a)(19). This section sets out those persons who can be denied 
entry into the United States: 
Any alien who ... has procured a visa or other documentation, or 
seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by willfully misrepre-
senting a material fact .... 
Thus, petitioners were deportable under Section 1251(a)(l). Addi-
tionally, petitioners were deportable under Section 1251(a)(2), 
where misrepresentation of citizenship is held to be equivalent to 
entry without inspection.51 
Section 1251(f), however, contains a "saving" clause, providing 
that: 
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of 
aliens within the United States on the ground that they were exclud-
able at the time of entry as aliens who ... have procured visas or 
other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or 
misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible 
at the time of entry who is the ... parent ... of a United States 
citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 
Thus, the petitioners assert that Section 1251(f) prevents their de-
portation, because of the birth of their children in the United States. 
The Court rejected petitioners' argument and held that subsec-
tion (f) waives deportation only for aliens who are excludable by 
reason of the fraud referred to in Section 1182(a)(19), and hence 
deportable under Section 1251(a)(l). If the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service relied on these sections alone, deportation would 
not be in order. However, subsection (f) does not protect petitioners 
under Section 1251(a)(2) (entry without inspection), because 
subsection (f) deals only with entry procured "by fraud or 
misrepresentation." Section 1251(a)(2) does not make fraud an ele-
ment of deportation. Therefore, subsection (f) does not apply. Thus, 
eral, be deported who-
(1) at the time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable 
by the law existing at the time of such entry; [or] 
(2) entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other 
than as designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States in violation of 
this chapter or in violation of any other law of the United States . . . . 
51. Ex parte Saadi, 26 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 616; Goon Mee 
Heung v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 380 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S . 975 (1968). 
13
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the petitioners were held deportable despite their familial ties in the 
United States.52 
ARBITRATION 
Bankruptcy 
Fotochrome v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975). 
This case presented questions concerning the effect of a foreign 
arbitral award rendered after the filing of a Chapter XI petition in 
a U.S. bankruptcy court. 
Fotochrome, a Delaware corporation, entered into a contract 
with Copal, a Japanese corporation neither present nor doing busi-
ness in the United States. Pursuant to the contract, Copal filed a 
petition for arbitration with the Japanese Commercial Arbitration 
Association in 1967. Toward the conclusion of over two years of 
proceedings, Fotochrome filed under Chapter XI of the Bankuptcy 
Act in New York. A stay was issued on March 26, 1970, enjoining 
creditors from commencing or continuing any action, suit, or arbi-
tration proceeding against the debtor.53 
The arbitral tribunal in Japan was informed of the stay but 
decided that the order was not effective in Japan. Copal was 
awarded $624,458 on October 21. The next day, October 22, Copal 
filed a proof of claim in Fotochrome's bankruptcy proceeding for 
this amount. The district court below54 reversed an order of the 
bankruptcy court, which had refused to recognize the arbitral 
award. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district 
court that since the bankruptcy court did not enjoy personal juris-
diction over Copal until they filed proof of claim on October 22, the 
stay did not operate against them, thus entitling Copal to continue 
52. Brennan and Marshall, J.J., strongly dissented, arguing that subsection (f) is a hu-
manitarian provision aimed at keeping families united and that, therefore, it should be 
interpreted in favor of the alien, and not against him as the majority had done . They pointed 
to a prior decision, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966) , 
as requiring a holding contrary to the majority . 420 U.S. at 631. 
53. The referee issued an order enjoining "all creditors of the debtor . . . from commenc-
ing or continuing any actions, suits, arbitrations or the enforcement of any claim in any Court 
against the debtor." 517 F.2d at 514. 
54. 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
55. Nor did the stay operate against Fotochrome, as it was only directed at creditors. 
The court assumed, arguendo, that a bankruptcy court could stay domestic arbitration 
proceedings. However, to be effective against foreign arbitration proceedings, the court must 
have (as it did not have here) in personam jurisdiction over the creditor in question . 517 F .2d 
at 516. 
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the arbitration proceedings. The arbitral award was a "binding ad-
judication on the merits and unreviewable by the Bankruptcy 
Court."56 
However, the court held that the arbitral award could not be 
considered a "judgment" provable against the debtor in posses-
sion.57 The court reasoned that the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards58 distinguishes be-
tween the granting and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards, allowing for refusal to enforce for specified conditions. 59 
Copal could, however, seek confirmation of its arbitral award, 
and if successful, could thereafter file such as proof of claim in a 
Chapter XI proceeding.60 
CHOICE OF LAW 
Strict Liability 
Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975). 
Plaintiff, a member of the United States Army, was seriously 
injured by a premature explosion of a howitzer round while serving 
in combat in Cambodia. The shell was manufactured in Texas by 
the defendant, a Maryland corporation with its principal place of 
business in Pennsylvania. The district court judge held that the 
strict liability principles of Texas law governed and gave judgment 
for the plaintiff. 
In this appeal, the defendant challenged, inter alia, the choice 
56. 517 F.2d at 517-18. The court also pointed out that under the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. III, [1970) 3 
U.S.T. 2517, 2519, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 40 (1970): 
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce 
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is 
relied upon .... There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions 
or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which 
this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition and enforcement of the 
domestic arbitral awards. 
57. 11 U.S.C. §103(a) (1970) states: 
Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are 
founded upon 
(5) provable debts reduced to judgments after the filing of the petition and before 
consideration of the bankrupt's application for a discharge . . . . 
58. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, art. VI, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 41 (1970). 
59. Such conditions of enforcement are not here applicable. 
60. 9 U.S.C. §207 (1970). This section provides for the confirmation of arbitral awards. 
Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§5301-09 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75) with 9 U.S.C. §205 (1970). 
517 F.2d at 518-19. 
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of law. It argued that the lower court erred in applying the substan-
tive law of Texas and instead should have applied the conflict of law 
rules of the Texas forum-which would apply Cambodian law. 61 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's 
choice of law. It reasoned that it would not apply the law of a 
jurisdiction, Cambodia, that had no interest in the case. 62 The court 
noted that, in the present suit, all the states with any possible 
interest in the case-Wisconsin, the plaintiff's domicile; Tennessee, 
the domicile of another serviceman injured by the explosion; 
Pennsylvania; and Texas-were strict liability states. On the other 
hand, Cambodia had no interest in applying its own law, which 
required that fault be proven. Such laws were aimed at protecting 
Cambodian manufacturers but were indifferent toward American 
companies. 
The court also reasoned that, under established principles of 
international law, Cambodia had no standing to determine rights 
and liabilities between foreigners arising out of the military activi-
ties of a foreign power. 63 
EXTRADITION 
Plea Bargaining 
Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1975). 
This case involved the duty of the United States to adhere to 
its promise, made pursuant to a bargain in a criminal case, not to 
extradite the petitioner. 
Petitioner, a Swiss national, had an uncompleted prison sent-
ence for murder outstanding against her in Switzerland. She was 
subsequently arrested with a companion in Miami, and both were 
charged with being couriers in a large drug chain. In an effort to 
induce their cooperation, the U.S. Government made a bargain in 
which for their testimony they would be able to plead guilty to a 
lesser charge and receive a shortened sentence. 
61. Klaxon v. Stenton Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) . 
62. See Lester v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 433 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
402 U.S. 909 (1971). There, as here, the court refused to apply the conflict of law principles 
of the forum in a diversity action, where the result would be application of the law of a 
jurisdiction that had no interest in the case. 
63. " 'A [nation] is understood to cede a portion of [her] territorial jurisdiction where 
[she] allows the troops of a foreign nation to pass through [her] dominions.'" 512 F.2d at 
81, quoting Marshall, C.J., in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 
(1812). 
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In addition, the U.S. Government agreed that it would "use its 
best efforts to get them to a country other than Switzerland." In 
other words, they were to be protected against deportation to Switz-
erland.64 
During her imprisonment, Switzerland instituted extradition 
proceedings against the petitioner. Upon learning that the Justice 
Department was not making an effort to live up to its promise, 
petitioner brought this suit.65 The district court below held that the 
petitioner should be discharged from further detention based on the 
Miami conviction, and enjoined and set aside the execution of the 
extra di ti on order. 66 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded this 
order. It held that the U.S. prosecutor had a duty, at a minimum, 
to make a presentation to the Department of State concerning the 
bargain reached. The principle of "primary jurisdiction" requires 
that before the case could be properly adjudicable, the court would 
need to know what the Secretary of State proposed to do. Without 
a unified sovereign pronouncement of the U.S. Government between 
the two departments involved, the judicial remedy was not avail-
able. 
The court indicated, however, that if the U.S. Government's 
position was not favorable toward petitioner, full hearings should be 
held by the district court concerning the apparent failure of the 
Justice Department "to use our best efforts."67 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
Kidnapping 
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975). 
This case is one of several recent decisions68 that substantially 
64. 513 F.2d at 863. 
65. Id. at 867-68. Towards the end of the prison term provided for by the bargain, 
following which she was to have been paroled, petitioner learned through a customs agent 
that Swiss authorities wanted her returned and that the U.S. Government would probably 
not fulfill its promise to prevent extradition to Switzerland. She subsequently escaped and 
was at large two years. It was upon her recapture and return to prison that the Government 
specifically refused to keep the bargain. Following the return to Switzerland of petitioner's 
co-defendant, this suit was brought. 
66. Unreported. The three year sentence orginally agreed upon had been served . 513 F.2d 
at 868. 
67. 513 F .2d at 872. The district court found an even stricter standard of absolute 
liability, requiring specific enforcement of the plea bargain. 513 F.2d at 868. 
68. See also In re David, 390 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ill. 1975). In an extradition proceeding, 
17
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limit the doctrine announced in United States v. Toscanino. 69 In 
Toscanino, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that, where 
the custody of a defendant was secured by abusing him and kidnap-
ping him from a foreign nation, the criminal courts are thereby 
deprived of jurisdiction. 
In the present case, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Lujan, 
who was located in Argentina. A licensed pilot, Lujan was hired to 
fly to Bolivia an individual who represented himself as a business-
man. The entire scenario was actually planned by American agents 
who arranged for Lujan's apprehension through paid Bolivian po-
licemen, not acting under the orders of their superiors. Lujan was 
then placed on board an airliner to New York where he was brought 
to trial. 70 
The court compared the facts of this case with those in 
Toscanino, and held that the Toscanino doctrine does not apply to 
mere "irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant's arrival in 
the jurisdiction. " 71 Unlike Toscanino, Lujan's abduction did not 
involve allegations of shocking government conduct.72 
Similiarly, the court rejected Lujan's contention that his 
abduction violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations 
Charter73 and Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States.74 Unlike Toscanino (where violations of the conventions 
had been found), 75 there was no protest made by the state, here 
Bolivia, where the abduction took place. The court held that, as the 
the defendant brought a motion to compel answers to interrogatories as to whether he was 
kidnapped and brought into the United States. The defendant claimed that agents of the 
United States engaged in such activity in securing his custody from Brazil. 
The court denied the motion stating, inter alia, that David failed to allege conduct so 
outrageous and shocking as to fall within the Toscanino exception to jurisdiction. 
69. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). 
70. 510 F.2d at 63. At no time was any request for extradition made. 
71. 511 F.2d at 65. 
72. In Toscanino, the defendant was kidnapped, beaten in front of his pregnant wife, 
subjected to torture, denied sleep and food for several days at a time, etc. In the present case, 
allegations of conduct of this nature were lacking. 510 F.2d at 64. 
73. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter provides: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
7 4. Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provides: 
The territory of a State is inviolable, it may not be the object, even temporarily of 
military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State directly or 
indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages 
obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized. 
75. 500 F.2d at 277-78. 
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cited provisions were drafted for the protection of state sovereignty, 
any individual rights they might generate are derivative only 
through the state. Thus, by its failure to protest, the court held, 
Bolivia had waived its rights and had acquiesced in the abduction.76 
Hence, the petition for habeas corpus was denied. 77 
LAW OF THE SEA 
Continental Shelf 
United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). 
The United States was granted leave to file a complaint invok-
ing the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against 13 states78 
located on the Atlantic seaboard: Maine, New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Flor-
ida.79 The complaint asserted a separate cause of action against each 
of the states, alleging that: 
"The United States is now entitled, to the exclusion of the 
defendant State, to exercise sovereignty rights over the seabed and 
subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean, lying more than three geo-
graphical miles seaward from the ordinary low watermark and from 
the outer limits of inland waters on the coast, extending seaward to 
the outer edge of the Continental Shelf, for the purpose of exploring 
the area and exploiting the natural resources. " 80 
In addition, the United States alleged that each state asserted some 
right or title repugnant to the claim of the United States of exclusive 
jurisdiction, and requested a decree declaring the precise rights of 
the United States.81 
76. 510 F.2d at 67. 
77. See also United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975). Although the United States 
requested the arrest and expulsion of the defendant which was followed by his torture by 
Chilean authorities, in the absence of a substantial role of American misconduct, Toscanino 
does not extend to illegal conduct of foreign authorities. 
78. Original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court pursuant to U.S. Constitution, article III, 
section 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1970), was granted in 395 U.S. 955 (1969) . 
79. The complaint against Florida was severed because of significant issues not in com-
mon with the other defendant states. In United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975), the 
Court referred the case to a Special Master to consider the following issues: (1) whether 
Florida Bay was a juridical bay; and (2) whether the closing lines delimiting the internal 
waters of Florida Bay should be delimited by drawing the closing lines around the three 
groups of islands which constitute the Florida Keys. The case awaits further adjudication 
upon recommendation from the Special Master. 
80. 420 U.S. at 517. 
81. Id. 
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This case represents the fourth installment in a series of cases 
in which the United States has sought a judicial declaration of its 
exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf.82 In each of the 
three previous cases, United States v. California, 83 United States v. 
Louisiana, 84 and United States v. Texas, 85 the Supreme Court held 
that the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over the continen-
tal shelf appurtenant to the respective states. The principles which 
the Court held dispositive in California, and which were reaffirmed 
in Louisiana and in Texas, may be briefly summarized. Jurisdiction 
over the continental shelf of the United States is absolute in the 
Federal Government as an incident of sovereignty; whatever rights 
the individual states may have had prior to joining the Union ceased 
at the moment of statehood. As a matter of constitutional law, 
"protection and control of the [marginal sea] has been and is a 
function of national external sovereignty."86 
The Court's discussion in each of the previous cases incorpo-
rated the defendants in Maine by reference within the rule of the 
case, however: 
the defendant States were not parties to United States v. California 
or to the relevant decisions [thereafter] and they are not precluded 
by res judicata from litigating the issues decided by those cases. 117 
The defendants in Maine contended that as successors in title 
of the Crown of England they had "the exclusive right of dominion 
and control over the seabed underlying the Atlantic Ocean seaward 
from its coastline to the limits of the jurisdiction of the United 
States."88 The defendants also alleged that any U.S. interference 
with the exclusive rights of the states over the continental shelf 
would be violative of the Constitution.89 In support of their position, 
the defendants refer to the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 90 which 
82. See generally Convention On The Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958 [1964] 1 
U.S.T . 471 , T .I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964). 
83. 332 U.S. 19 (1947) . Held that the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf appurtenant to California in the Pacific Ocean. 
84. 339 U.S . 19 (1950). Held that the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
contintental shelf appurtenant to Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. 
85. 339 U.S. 707 (1950) . Held that the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf appurtenant to Texas in the Gulf of Mexico. 
86. 332 U.S. at 34, quoted in 420 U.S. at 520. 
87 . 420 U.S. at 527. 
88. Id. at 518. 
89. There was no reference to specific sections of the Constitution in the defendants' 
allegation. 
90. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1970). 
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enumerates states rights regarding the continental shelf. Finally, 
the defendants alleged that California, Louisiana, and Texas "were 
erroneously decided and should be overruled."91 
The Court, in full agreement with the Special Master to whom 
the case had been referred, declined to overrule the principles estab-
lished in California, Louisiana, and Texas. In giving judgment for 
the United States, the Court reaffirmed its previous holdings that, 
regardless of any claim prior to statehood, jurisdiction over the con-
tinental shelf is an incident of national sovereignty. Further: 
"[T]he Constitution allotted to the federal government jurisdiction 
over foreign commerce, foreign affairs and ·national defense" and 
that "it necessarily follows, as a matter of constitutional law, that 
as attributes of these external sovereign powers the federal govern-
ment has paramount rights in the marginal sea."92 
Maine is the first case since the passage of the Submerged 
Lands Act of 1953 which has raised the issue of which governmental 
authority-the individual states or the Federal Government-has 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The Court conceded that the 
Submerged Lands Act transferred to the states various rights to the 
seabed appurtenant to the coast. "[H]owever, this transfer was in 
no wise inconsistent with paramount national power but was merely 
an exercise of that authority. " 93 The Submerged Lands Act ex-
pressly provides that: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to affect in any wise 
the rights of the United States to the natural resources of that por-
tion of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf lying seaward 
and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable water ... all 
of which natural resources appertain to the United States, and the 
jurisdiction and control of which by the United States is 
confirmed. 94 
The Court noted that its decision here was further buttressed by the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, which provides in perti-
nent part: 
The term "outer Continental Shelf'' means all submerged lands 
lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable 
waters . . . and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the 
91. 420 U.S. at 518-19. 
92. Id. at 522-23, quoting from Special Master's Report at 23. 
93. Id. at 524. 
94. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1302 (1970). 
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United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control. 95 
In conclusion, the Court held that the practices of business, 
both public and private, had been conducted in accordance with 
and in reliance upon the decisions in California, Louisiana, and 
Texas, and that reversal of those decisions would, therefore, be in-
appropriate. 96 
Historic Bays 
United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975). 
The United States brought suit in federal district court97 
against the State of Alaska to quiet title and for injunctive relief, 
contending that Cook Inlet98 constituted high seas and thus fell 
under U.S. jurisdiction. Alaska alleged that Cook Inlet is an historic 
bay, and therefore internal waters subject to state jurisdiction. The 
court of appeals99 affirmed the decision of the district court100 which 
gave judgment for Alaska. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Black-
mun writing for a six justice majority, reversed the decisions 
below. 101 
95. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). 
96. Since 1953, when this legislation was enacted, 33 lease sales have been held, 
in which 1,940 leases, embracing over eight million acres, have been issued. The 
Outer Continental Shelf, since 1953, has yielded over three billion barrels of oil, 19 
trillion m.c.f. of natural gas, 13 million long tons of sulfur, and over four million long 
tons of salt. In 1973 alone, 1,081,000 barrels of oil and 8.9 billion cubic feet of natural 
gas were extracted daily from the Outer Continental Shelf. Exploitation of our re-
sources offshore implicates a broad range of federal legislation, ranging from the 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, incorporated into the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, to the more recent Coastal Zone Management 
Act [of 1972). 
420 U.S. at 527-28. 
97. 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972) . The Court noted that the United States appeared 
to have qualified to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article Ill, 
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution. 422 U.S. at 186 n. 2. 
98. The inlet extends northeastward well over 150 miles into the Alaskan land 
mass, with Kenai Peninsula to the southwest and the Chigmit Mountains to the 
northwest. The city of Anchorage is near the head of the inlet. The upper, or inner 
portion, of the inlet is not in dispute, for that part is conceded to be inland waters 
subject to Alaska's sovereignty. 
422 U.S. at 185. 
99. 497 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of this case at the court of appeals 
level see 2 SYR. J . INT'L L. & CoM. 347, 363-65 (1974). 
100. 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972). 
101. Stewart and Rehnquist, J.J., dissented, agreeing with the courts below that Alaska 
sustained its historic bay argument. Douglas, J., took no part in the consideration or decision 
of the case. 
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State jurisdiction over the continental shelf appurtenant to the 
United States is delimited pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act, 
which provides for state ownership of the continental shelf extend-
ing three miles from the coastline .102 In United States v. 
California, 103 the Court concluded that the definitions contained in 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone104 
should be incorporated into the Submerged Lands Act. The Con-
102. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970), provides in pertinent part: 
It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that: (1) title to and 
ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respec-
tive States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters; and (2) the right 
and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural 
resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the 
provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to 
the respective States . . . . 
The Submerged Lands Act defines a state's boundaries in 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1970) which 
states in part: 
The term "boundaries" includes the seaward boundaries of a State ... as they 
existed at the time such State became a member of the Union ... but in no event 
shall the term "boundaries" or the term "lands beneath navigable waters" be inter-
preted as extending from the coast line more than three geographical miles into the 
Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean. 
103. 381 U.S. 139 (1965). 
104. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 
art. 7, [1964] 2 U.S.T., 1606, 1609, T.l.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 208 (effective June 
10, 1964) which provides: 
1. This article relates to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State. 
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose 
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked 
waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall 
not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that 
of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indenta-
tion. 
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying 
between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining 
the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence 
of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shalt be drawn 
on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different 
mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the 
water areas of the indentation. 
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points 
of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these 
two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal 
waters. 
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance 
points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles 
shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of 
water that is possible with a line of that length. 
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in any 
case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied. 
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vention provides that 24 miles is the maximum width allowed base 
lines measuring the breadth of the natural entrance points of a bay, 
before that bay ceases to be classified as internal waters. Historic 
bays are excepted, however, from the 24-mile rule. 105 The distance 
between the natural entrance points of Cook Inlet is approximately 
47 miles. The parties agreed, therefore, that the dispositive issues 
of the case was whether or not Cook Inlet constitutes an historic 
bay. The Court, noting the absence of a definition of "historic bay" 
in the Convention, adopted the following definition from the 
Louisiana Boundary Case, 106 as accurately reflecting the view gener-
ally accepted among nations: 
[A]t least three factors are significant in the determination of his-
toric bay status: (1) the claiming nation must have exercised au-
thority over the area; (2) that exercise must have been continuous; 
(3) foreign states must have acquiesced in the exercise of 
authority. 107 
The district court traced Alaska's historical claims to Cook In-
let through three periods of history: a period of Russian sovereignty 
between 1786 and 1867;108 a period of U.S. sovereignty between 1867 
and 1958 during which time Alaska was a possession, and later a 
territory of the United States; 109 and finally the period of Alaska's 
statehood in the United States. The district court concluded that 
in each successive period the respective sovereign exercised control 
and dominion over Cook Inlet with the acquiescence of foreign na-
tions, thus conferring historic bay status on Cook Inlet. 
In reversing the decision below, the Supreme Court made a 
detailed review of each respective historical period and held that the 
proof amassed by Alaska (accepted by the courts below) was insuffi-
cient to confer historic bay status on Cook Inlet, and that the con-
clusion of the district court "was based on an erroneous assessment 
of the legal significance of the facts it had found." 110 Regarding the 
period of Russian sovereignty, the Court held that the sparse evi-
dence of the early Russian settlement indicates a claim to the land 
105. Id. 
106. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969). 
107. 422 U.S. at 189. 
108. The first Russian settlement in Alaska was in 1786. The United States gained 
possession and sovereignty over Alaska in the Treaty of Cession of 1867. 422 U.S. at 190, 196. 
109. This period began with the Treaty of Cession of 1867, continued with Alaska becom-
ing a territory in 1912, and ended with Alaska becoming a state in 1958. 
110. 422 U.S. at 203. 
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adjacent to Cook Inlet, but that there is little evidence indicative 
of an exercise of sovereign jurisdiction over the entirety of Cook 
Inlet. m The Court found that the several federal statutes constitut-
ing fishing and wildlife regulations which were in force during the 
period of U.S. sovereignty prior to Alaska's statehood were not in-
dicative of a U.S. intention to treat Cook Inlet as internal waters, 
which is requisite to confer historic bay status on Cook Inlet. 112 The 
fact that Alaska has enforced fishing and wildlife restrictions over 
Cook Inlet similar to those previously promulgated by the United 
States is an insufficient claim for historic bay status for the same 
reasons which were applied to the period of U.S. sovereignty.113 Fi-
nally, the lack of foreign protests to whatever rights were exercised 
over Cook Inlet is not sufficient to constitute acquiescence in the 
claim of historic bay status for Cook Inlet. Alaska failed to prove 
that foreign nations either knew or should have known of an historic 
bay claim, and this was necessary prior to their silence being inter-
preted as acquiescence.114 
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 
(D.N.J. 1975). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituted 
this action for injunctive and other relief against nine defendants, 
of whom four were American citizens, three were American corpora-
tions, and two were Canadian corporations allegedly owned by one 
of the American citizen defendants. The complaint filed by the SEC 
alleged an elaborate scheme to defraud a Canadian corporation. 
This corporation had been authorized by the Canadian provincial 
111. The Court's detailed discussion of the period of Russian sovereignty appears at 422 
U.S. at 190-91. 
112. In international law, the distinguishing characteristic of "internal waters" is that 
the sovereign exercises complete jurisdiction over the waters, including the right to prohibit 
innocent passage. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 223 et seq. (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963). 
An historic bay is within the internal waters classification. Therefore, the exercise of sover-
eignty necessary to confer historic bay status must be the exercise of exclusive and complete 
jurisdiction. The several wildlife and fishing regulatory acts do not treat foreign vessels 
differently from U.S. vessels, hence they do not constitute "internal waters" jurisdiction. For 
the Court's discussion of the history of U.S. sovereignty see 422 U.S. at 192-200. 
113. For the Court's detailed discussion of the period since Alaska's statehood see 422 
U.S. at 200-03. 
114. 422 U.S. at 199-200. 
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government of Manitoba to create a forestry complex. The SEC 
claimed that this scheme violated numerous sections of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933115 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 116 They 
conceded that there was no direct impact on U.S. securities mar-
kets, 117 and that the fraud was perpetrated against a Canadian 
entity. Most of the frauds' primary activities took place 1n Canada. 
However, there was significant American involvment. In addition to 
the participation of U.S. citizens and corporations, a New York 
office of the Swiss Bank Corporation had been utilized as a conduit 
for a percentage of the manipulated funds.11 8 Second, a Master Fi-
nance Agreement, part of the fraudulent scheme, was executed in 
the State of New York. 119 Finally, facilities of U.S. commerce such 
as mails, telephone, and telegraph had been utilized in furtherance 
of the scheme. 120 
Each of the nine defendants moved that the case be dismissed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 121 This motion was the single 
issue upon which the court focused for disposition. For the purposes 
of the motion, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint were 
accepted as true and the merits of the case were not to be reached 
until subject matter jurisdiction had been established. 122 
The defendants argued "that the transactions alleged in the 
complaint were essentially foreign in nature having no significant 
impact on either the domestic investing public or the domestic 
securities markets, " 123 thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion. This argument was based on the decision in United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of America, 124 and embodied the objective principle 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 125 
115. Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). 
116. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.lOb-5 (1975). 
117. 391 F. Supp. at 1173 n.1. 
118. Id. at 1176. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. FED. R. CIV. P . 12(b)(l). 
122. Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1249 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 
(1972); Lasher v. Shafer, 460 F.2d 343, 344 (3d Cir. 1972). 
123. 391 F. Supp. at 1172-73. 
124. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
125. The objective principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction is explained in RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965): 
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to 
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if 
either 
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The court said in response: 
Conceding that there has been no direct impact, the Commis-
sion [SEC] nevertheless asserts that the federal courts are vested 
with jurisdiction where a scheme to defraud foreign entities is de-
vised in this country by Americans who utilized the means of inter-
state commerce to achieve their objectives. 126 
This is the principle of subjective extraterritorial jurisdiction127 
expressed in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. 
Maxwell. 128 
The court's analysis began with evocation of the principle that 
extraterritorial application of federal regulatory legislation must be 
a question of municipal, not international, law.129 Therefore, 
whether subject matter jurisdiction obtains in a particular case is a 
matter of legislative intent. The question here is whether Congress 
intended the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 to have extraterritorial application.130 The fact that foreign 
relations law, through the subjective principle of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, does not preclude subject matter jurisdiction does not 
resolve the issue of whether jurisdiction was to be invoked in this 
particular case. 131 
The language of the respective statutes in question, according 
to the court, "did not prescribe an immediate jurisdictional solution 
to this problem of transnational law," 132 nor did the court find legis-
lative history focusing on the precise jurisdictional issue presented 
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements 
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal 
systems, or 
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which 
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a 
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is 
not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have 
reasonably developed legal systems. 
126. 391 F. Supp. at 1173. 
127. The subjective principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction is explained by the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 17(a) (1965) which 
states in pertinent part: 
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law 
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, 
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct 
outside the territory . . . . 
128. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). 
129. See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Leasco Data 
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). 
130. 391 F. Supp. at 1172. 
131. Id. at 1175. 
132. Id. at 1173. 
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in Kasser. However, from a review of the language of the statutes, 
the general legislative history, and prior decisional law, the court 
concluded that it was beyond dispute that the principal objective 
was protection of American purchasers who are exposed to fraudu-
lent offers of sales of securities in interstate commerce. 133 
In dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
Chief Judge Whipple, writing for the Kasser court, held that, not-
withstanding the American individual and corporate defendants, 
and the utilization of American facilities of commerce in effecting 
the fraudulent scheme, Congress did not intend for the securities 
legislation to apply to an essentially foreign transaction where there 
had been no effect on the U.S. securities market or on U.S. inves-
tors. In so holding, Chief Judge Whipple distinguished Kasser from 
several prior cases134 in which subject matter jurisdiction had been 
invoked with far less participation of American citizens and corpo-
rations, and with far less utilization of U.S. commerce facilities, but 
where there had been at least a minimal effect on U.S. securities 
markets or on U.S. investors. 135 
San{ ord Young, Editor 
Gloria N. Dabiri 
Ronald D. Neubauer 
Lisa Sperber Young 
133. Id. at 1175. See also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1968). 
134. See Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326; Travis v. 
Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Gulflntemational Finance Corp., 
223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). 
135. Although the precise jurisdictional issue presented in Kasser has not been presented 
in other cases, two recent cases involving extraterritorial application of the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 anticipated and responded to the jurisdictional 
issue raised in Kasser. In two companion cases in the second circuit, Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), and I.LT. v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 
1975), Friendly, J., writing for the court, indicated that there would exist subject matter 
jurisdiction in a situation similar to that in Kasser. 
In Bersch, Friendly, J., wrote: 
We are indeed holding in IIT. v. Vencap, Ltd., ... decided this day, that Congress 
did not mean the United States to be used as a base for fraudulent securities schemes 
even when the victims are foreigners, at least in the contexts of suits by the SEC or 
by named foreign plaintiffs. 
519 F.2d at 987 (emphasis added). 
The "holding" referred to by Bersch in Vencap was expressed in the following language: 
We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base 
for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are ped-
dled only to foreigners. This country would surely look askance if one of our neighbors 
stood by silently and permitted misrepresented securities to be poured into the 
United States. By the same token it is hard to believe Congress meant to prohibit 
the SEC from policing similar activities within this country. 
319 F.2d at 1017. 
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CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LAW. Edited by D. Barry, W. Butler, 0. Gins-
burgs. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. Pp. xxvi, 242, 52.50 
guilders. 
It is surprising, given the intense interest the United States 
has shown since the close of World War II towards the Soviets, that 
the Soviet legal system should be virtually ignored. Few U.S. law-
yers have been aware of the existence of a Soviet legal system, much 
less concerned with its study. Among the few is John N. Hazard, 
who for 40 years has followed a distinguished legal career, a 
considerable portion of which devoted to the study of socialist law. 
It is to him that this volume of essays concerning contemporary 
Soviet law is devoted. Unfortunately, paucity of U.S. interest in 
socialist law is still indirectly evident, even in this endeavor, for this 
series of essays are the product, for the most part, of non-U.S. law-
yers and professors. In these days when detente is a slogan and the 
media is full of grain deals, oil purchases, and an overall cooling of 
East-West tensions, one would assume that modest attention might 
be paid to the legal underpinnings of the world's second power. But 
such a trend is not discernable. Even this highly informative series 
of essays may do little to create additional interest in this neglected 
field. 
There are several reasons for this. One reason is an apparent 
lack of interest in Soviet affairs per se within the United States, 
except as they affect political and military strategy. 1 Another is that 
Soviet legal nomeclature and emphasis can be very confusing to 
Western readers, who may be likely to dismiss Contemporary Soviet 
Law as too abstruse. This would be unfortunate, as this volume 
provides an illuminating insight into the mechanics, philosophy, 
and direction of a Socialist legal system. 
Standing beside the other legal systems of the world, the Soviet 
legal system presents a refined, sophisticated, and well-designed 
scheme conceived to fulfill the social, political, and economic goals 
of the underlying ideology. Whereas Wes tern legal systems seek to 
achieve a rough effectuation of their basic ideologies, experience has 
shown that all too often this is accomplished in a random fashion 
1. Ironically, the U.S . attitude toward the Soviet legal apparatus may have been initially 
influenced by attitudes of the Soviets themselves. It was an early assertion of Lenin (following 
Marx and Engels) that the courts (and government bureaucracy in general) were merely 
instruments of power designed to oppress the masses, and that with the growth of the classless 
society they would become unnecessary and wither away. V. LENIN, THE STATE AND 
REVOLUTION 78-85 (1932) . 
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with little evidence of skillful design or articulated thought as to 
goal or purpose. Although the strength of Western systems may 
indeed lie in that fact, nonetheless it is fascinating to contrast a 
system which, rather than evolving to meet changing political, 
social, and economic milieus, was conceived from the outset to meet 
specific goals. Perhaps there is a lesson to be gleaned by appreciat-
ing what foresight can accomplish. The central theme of this work, 
if one can be defined, is the role of planning-which is as evident 
within the legal system as in the economic sector. The traditional 
place of planning in the socialist scheme of things is well-known, but 
perhaps often overlooked, as a moving force in the development of 
a legal structure. 
The editors of this book do not survey the entire Soviet legal 
system, but rather focus on topical areas which are familiar to West-
ern legal minds. The Soviets too are facing the legal problems posed 
by environmental changes, computers, increasingly sophisticated 
industrial change, and a kaleidoscopic international scene. This is 
not to say that the more traditional areas of legal concern, criminal 
law, civil procedure, and social control are neglected here, but 
rather that these essays are intended to reflect the current concerns 
of socialist law, which are seen as requiring growth and evolution. 
A particularly interesting selection by Dietrich A. Loeber treats 
what may be a peculiar Soviet phenomenon, the Samizdat-a form 
of self-publishing, which is both increasing and outside the control 
of the State to a large degree. Samizdat, although originally 
concerned with the publication of belles-lettres, has of late become 
the principal vehicle for the dissemination of dissident political 
writings. Samizdat encompasses all publication which falls outside 
of government publishing procedures, and to this extent can be 
considered a covert and clandestine activity. This article is appar-
ently the first to consider the legal aspect of Samizdat, although its 
political and social influences have been the source of much public-
ity. Although the author does not discuss specific instances as much 
as the overall legal treatment of Samizdat, the reader cannot help 
but be reminded of the works of Solzhenitsyn and other Soviet 
dissidents which had first been published via the vehicle of 
Samizdat. Loeber's contribution alone would make the reading of 
this volume rewarding. 
Another role of Soviet law, which in Western systems is re-
garded as a useful but not critical element of the legal system, is the 
educative function of the law, particularly in Soviet criminal law 
and civil procedure. The Soviets view this aspect of the law as vital 
30
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to the development of character in the people, the inculcation of the 
Soviet value system, and finally the training of the population to 
think and react in the manner demanded by the State. The author 
distinguishes the educative role (vospitatel' naia rol'prava) of the 
law from the mere dispersal of knowledge about law and legal values 
among the population. As with many other facets of Soviet law, the 
educative machinery is designed to accomplish very specific ends 
and should not be confused with the general collateral educative by-
product of most legal systems. Harold Berman's treatment of this 
aspect is highly informative and interesting. Parenthetically, it 
might be noted that Professor Berman is also a qreatly respected 
scholar of Soviet law and, like Hazard before him, is one of that 
band which has not dismissed socialist legal systems (and socialis-
tic societies in general) as a passing phenomenon. 
Even if one has not intended to become a student of Soviet 
law, this work will provide a much deeper knowledge of the me-
chanics in the treatment of political dissent and a greater apprecia-
tion of the struggle a monolithic legal system must endure if it is 
not to be rent asunder by a growing body of liberal thought and 
concern. A reader who has formed his attitudes toward Soviets from 
association with the "Gulag Syndrome" noted in the works of Sol-
zhenitsyn cannot but be impressed with the means by which a legal 
system must confront and resolve the problems created by a Gulag 
mentality. In total this book deserves a place on the shelf of anyone 
interested in East-West relations and concerned about the future 
directions the current detente will take. 
JAMES K. WEEKS* 
*Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; Member of the Bar of the 
State of New York. 
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BOOKS RECEIVED 
THE FUNCTION OF DocuMENTS IN ISLAMIC LAW. Edited by J. Wakin. 
Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1972. Pp. ix, 121. 
$30.00. Often Western lawyers entering into legal relations with 
Islamic societies fail to anticipate the enormous influence religion 
has had on the shaping of Islamic legal systems. While the role of 
religion in legal relations is becoming smaller with the "Westerniza-
tion" of Mid-Eastern commercial relations, an understanding of the 
traditional Islamic law in this area is essential to the international 
lawyer. The editor has annotated a major Islamic work on the law 
of sales, Tahawi's Kitab Al-Shurut Al-Kabir. He has included the 
text of this document in the original Arabic, with annotations and 
an introduction to Islamic commercial law in general. Although 
perhaps not of immediate use to the newcomer to Islamic law, this 
book would be a valuable tool to the serious practicioner or scholar 
in this area. 
INFLATION, GROWTH & INTERNATIONAL FINANCE. By A. Cairncross. 
Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1975. Pp. 136. 
$14.95. This volume provides an excellent introduction to the princi-
ples, dynamic and control of international economic forces. Au-
thored by the former head of the U.K. Government Economic Ser-
vice and the Economic Development Institute in Washington, the 
book outlines and analyzes the techniques now utilized for interna-
tional economic control, such as the floating exchange rate, and 
speculates on future possible restrictions on international capital 
movements and upon the future of controls in general. 
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS. By M. Moskowitz. 
Leyden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff/Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana 
Publications, 1974. Pp. ix, 239. $18.50. Former Secretary General of 
the Consultive Council of Jewish Organizations-an independent 
consulting agency working with the United Nations and the Council 
of Europe-the author outlines what he feels to be a necessary re-
form in the present United Nations approach to human rights prob-
lems. It is the author's thesis that the United Nations should not 
be a mere passive defender of human rights, but an active advocate 
of a coherent human rights position. The book contains a history of 
human rights issues and a model program whereby ideas about 
human rights could be molded into social attitudes. 
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER. By M. 
Bassiouni. Leyden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff/Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: 
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Oceana Publications, 1974. Pp. xix, 630. $27.50. With the increase 
of international crime, both conventional and political, the prob-
lems of extradition have become manifold. This volume outlines the 
present state of the law in the areas of asylum, unlawful seizure, 
irregular rendition, and denial of extradition, while evaluating 
present policy, practice, and theories of jurisdiction. The author 
discusses both international and United States law and indicates 
several areas and outlooks badly in need of reform. 
THE LAW OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST. By H. Liebesny. Albany, 
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1975. Pp. 316. $22.00. 
Designed for the practitioner or scholar new to the Near and Middle 
East, this volume attempts to give a broad background to the sub-
ject. It covers both the history and principles of traditional Islamic 
law and the impact of Western law (both civil law and common law) 
upon this tradition. The author has included Islamic legal texts, 
modern treatise writers, and recent court decisions to illustrate the 
hybrid that Near and Middle Eastern law has become. An appendix 
of related readings and a glossary of Arabic legal terms serve as an 
excellent aid to those seeking an introduction into this complex but 
increasingly important area of world law. 
VERTRAGE UND DEKLARATIONEN 'OBER DEN FESTLANDSOCKEL. Edited by 
B. Riister. Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner, 1975. Pp. 181. 22.00 deutsch-
marks. At a time where energy sources and raw materials have 
become major political issues and the continental shelves are being 
increasingly exploited for their mineral wealth, this collection of 
Continental shelf treaties is an invaluable tool in the study of the 
law of the sea. The volume contains some 45 continental shelf 
delimitation treaties, either in the language of the original or in 
English translation, eight multilateral declarations, and maps of the 
most critical delimitation areas. The editor supplies, as well, an 
overview of continental shelf boundary issues. 
U.S.-JAPANESE COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS. By E. 
Roemer. Berkeley, California: University of California Institute of 
International Studies, 1975. Pp. xvii, 242. $3.95. Subtitled "a study 
of the trade-investment cycle in modern capitalism," this volume 
explores direct foreign investment patterns and trade trends of these 
two capitalist giants in their competition for third country markets. 
The analysis is extremely detailed and well-documented, and 
should prove a substantial asset to those concerned with the foreign 
investment area in general. 
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Th(} Syracuse University College o-f Law ,placemen-t
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Office is ready to assist lawyers, law fir;Ills, I and other em-
ployers_,,of legally traine<;i 1ndividuals in selecting the inost 
qualified personnel to meet their needs. 
I r 
i rfhe Pl~cement Office will forward on request resumes 
'--' indicating our student's interest~, experienc.e and \oholas-
" tic ac~_ieve~ent. ' -
}._ I ' , , , \ 
\. 
The Placement Office will arrange on-campus inter-
views for prospective employers or ass~st in making other 
arrangements to facilitate employer·-student interviews. 
\ 
\ 
Firms wishing to arrange interviews or obtain resumes 
for summe~, part-time or permari'ent positions please co~­
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